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97 cheological discoveries”; and even “postage stamps, tax stamps, and items of that nature, singly or in collections.” Thus, while all of the goods that fall into these categories are strictly speaking cultural goods according to the convention, not all of them are protected by it. In order to be protected, cultural goods have to have been “designated by each state as having importance in archeology, prehistory, history, literature, art, or science.” The fact that a cultural object can be identifi ed as belonging to a UNESCO Convention category is not enough for that object to be protected by it. Moreover, Article 5 of the 1970 Convention states that ad hoc commissions must be instituted by states for the purpose of establishing a nationally protected inventory. It is easy to understand, for example, that every postage stamp (Article 1 k), even if it is a cultural object according to the UNESCO Convention, is not ipso facto protected by its statutes. If this were so, it would be illegal to mail a letter. The stamp is only protected if it is listed on its inventory by the country that produced it and only if that country is a signatory to the convention. For the sake of completeness, we will add that the judge in the matter that came before the 45th Chambre Correctionnelle in Brussels had to take into account the exclusions that Belgium applied to its acceptance of the terms of the Convention at the time of ratifi cation. According to this exclusion, in Belgium “the term ‘cultural goods’ must be limited to the objects enumerated in the appendix to the regulations (CEE) #3911/92 as well as in the appendix of the Council of Directors #93/7/CEE.” This European defi nition of “cultural goods,” which notably introduces fi nancial limits that apply to certain categories, obviously does not replace the fi rst condition of an object’s being “listed,” but rather modifi es it. As such, the judge of the 45th Chambre Correctionnelle du Tribunal de Première Instance Francophone court in Brussels correctly interpreted Article 1 of the 1970 UNESCO Convention when she concluded that: For an object to be protected by the UNESCO Convention, it not only has to belong to one of the categories the Convention covers, but it must also have been identifi ed by the nation in question as belonging to a class of inalienable cultural objects. Having established that “no such designation by the country of origin” had been made, the court acquitted the French dealer on March 30, 2015. End of story. Conclusion While those with an interest in the legal process might be pleased to have had the opportunity to see a court rule on the application of the 1970 UNESCO Convention, and to have been reminded of the conditions pertaining to the protection it provides, one can only deplore the ignorance, all too common with regard to its statutes, that the public prosecutor, the police, and customs offi - cials clearly displayed. The public prosecutor, acting as he does in Belgium on behalf of the king, had been demanding prison time for crimes that had not been committed. It is a curious paradox that while the provisions of the UNESCO Convention of 1970 seem to be almost universally misunderstood, the document is nonetheless regularly brandished not only by countries seeking the return of objects originally from within their borders but also by authorities in countries where such objects have entered into collections. Many players on the world’s art market, undoubtedly intimidated by the risk—and the slowness and the expense—attendant to legal proceedings, give the convention effective authority in cases where it actually has none. To name just one example, many auction houses require that certain types of works that consignors offer to them must have entered into collections prior to 1970, and they refuse to accept them if that single requirement cannot be met. While one can only commend the resolve to “prevent the import, export, and transfer of illicit cultural goods” that the 1970 UNESCO Convention expresses, it should be borne in mind that commerce in cultural goods remains legal, and that, in fact, it can be an excellent means for communication between peoples, as well as a valuable tool for the preservation of humanity’s common patrimony. The objects illustrated here are not those that were the subject of the legal proceedings discussed in this article.


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